Why It Matters
A catastrophic chemical tank failure at a Longview, Washington paper mill has exposed a significant gap in state oversight: no government agency held responsibility for inspecting the type of above-ground storage tank that collapsed, killing at least nine people and leaving two more still unaccounted for.
The disaster raises serious questions about who bears responsibility for the structural integrity of industrial tanks holding hazardous chemicals at facilities across the Pacific Northwest.
What Happened
A massive above-ground storage tank at the Nippon Dynawave Packaging facility in Longview imploded on May 26, releasing a highly corrosive chemical known as white liquor — a caustic substance used in paper manufacturing that can cause severe burns on contact. The confirmed death toll has risen to nine, with two victims still missing and recovery crews working to locate them.
By Friday, Longview Fire Chief Brad Hannig confirmed a seventh body had been recovered from the site. Two additional individuals injured in the tank failure remained hospitalized at the Legacy Oregon Burn Center as of Thursday.
Recovery crews pumped out large volumes of liquid from the facility Thursday evening, and a battalion chief said workers were now operating in much closer proximity to where the two remaining victims are believed to be.
No Agency in Charge of Tank Inspections
State officials confirmed that Washington’s regulatory framework left above-ground industrial storage tanks largely outside the scope of routine government inspection. Washington’s Department of Ecology oversees water quality, air quality, and hazardous waste permits at the Nippon Dynawave facility — but those permits do not extend to the structural integrity of storage tanks.
The Department of Labor and Industries has authority to ensure companies are identifying on-site hazards, but does not perform storage tank inspections, according to a public affairs manager for the agency.
By contrast, underground storage tanks are inspected at minimum every three years by the Department of Ecology because of groundwater contamination risks — a protection that does not apply to above-ground tanks.
Marissa Baker, industrial hygiene program director at the University of Washington, put the burden plainly: “Ultimately, the responsibility falls on the mill owner and operator. Part of maintaining a safe and healthy work site is ensuring the structural integrity of their tanks that store extremely hazardous chemicals.”
Nippon Dynawave did not respond to requests for comment.
By the Numbers
- 900,000 gallons — capacity of the white liquor storage tank that failed
- 9 confirmed dead, 2 victims still missing as of Friday
- 2 survivors remain hospitalized at the Legacy Oregon Burn Center
- 23 dead fish collected near the mill by Department of Ecology crews since Tuesday
- 0 — number of state agencies with direct authority to inspect above-ground industrial storage tanks
Environmental Impact
An undetermined volume of white liquor spilled beyond the facility’s boundaries. Authorities confirmed some of the chemical flowed into the Columbia River, while additional amounts entered a local diking system.
The Department of Ecology’s lead spill responder said dead fish — including carp, redfish, and bluegill — have been recovered near the mill, and officials warned the public not to touch or collect any dead fish found in the area. Officials acknowledged that some fish that cannot be recovered will likely be discharged into the Columbia River as flushing operations continue.
Longview’s public works director said the city’s drinking water remains safe. Residents near affected ditches may notice a rotten egg odor, but officials said it is not a cause for alarm and reflects ongoing flushing and pumping operations.
What’s Next
The federal Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board is conducting an investigation into why the tank failed. State agencies have mobilized in response to the spill and ongoing recovery effort, but the investigation into the root cause of the structural failure remains in early stages.
The regulatory gap identified in this disaster will likely prompt discussion among Washington lawmakers and safety officials about whether above-ground industrial tanks storing hazardous substances should be subject to mandatory government inspection requirements going forward.
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